## 1NC

### Off

The affirmative’s valorization of “human rights” is not natural – it is explicitly anthropocentric and is the foundation of the dichotomy between “human” and the “environment”

Burdon 12 (Peter Burdon – PhD in Earth Jurisprudence and lecturer at Alelaide Law School, August 10, 2010, “ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE LIMITS OF RIGHTS TALK”, http://rightnow.org.au/topics/environment/environmental-protection-and-the-limits-of-rights-talk/) //MD

The rise of environmental human rights

During the 1970s the language of human rights began to make sense to broad communities of people as an “umbrella concept” for combating multiple forms of injustice. Most recently, there has been an attempt to extend human rights for environmental protection. There are two main arguments. First, that human beings have a right to a healthy environment i.e. a right to clean water. Second, that there are ecological limitations to human rights. While not yet implemented in “hard law” the latter argument refers to the idea that individual freedom is not only determined by a social context – but also by an ecological context.¶ Human rights discourse has assumed hegemonic status and is widely billed as “the only game in town” for environmental protection. Yet, many commentators have voiced serious concerns that **a human rights model cannot address the root causes of environmental exploitation.** To begin, the approach is overtly **anthropocentric.** Even the phrase “human rights and the environment” is species specific, focuses on “rights” which is an inherently individualistic concept and sets up an immediate dichotomy between the “human” and the “environment”.¶ Linguistics aside, **the very existence of environmental human rights reinforces the idea that the environment and natural resources exist only for human benefit and have no intrinsic worth.** In the example I cited above concerning groundwater pollution, my discussant’s rebuff could easily be viewed as consistent with the ethical framework of environmental human rights. Indeed, no human rights were being infringed, so what is the problem? Thus, while the language of environmental human rights has been seen as a politically useful tool for environmental groups to sway public opinion, it does not fundamentally challenge the mental ideas that partially explain environmental exploitation.¶ A second major critique of environmental human rights is that it seeks to adopt bourgeois legal concepts and treat them as both universal and foundational for the development of an alternative social form. In reality, this is no alternative at all since it merely re-inscribes dominant conceptions of value in a supposedly new framework. Foundational documents for environmental human rights discourse, such as the UN Universal Declaration of Human Right (1948), have also been used as central documents for market-based individualism. As such, it is doubtful whether they can provide the basis for a thoroughgoing critique of liberal or neoliberal capitalism. Indeed, whether it is politically useful to insist that the capitalist political order live up to its own foundational principles is one thing, but to imagine that this politics can lead to a radical displacement of capitalist growth economics is a serious error.

The affirmative’s critical pedagogy is change in the service of human freedom, taking for granted human/animal opposition, normalizing violence

Bell and Russell 2000 (Anne and Constance, Canadian journal of education, http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf)

Take, for example, Freire’s (1990) statements about the differences¶ between “Man” and animals. To set up his discussion of praxis and the¶ importance of “naming” the world, he outlines what he assumes to be¶ shared, commonsensical beliefs about humans and other animals. He¶ defines the boundaries of human membership according to a sharp, hierarchical dichotomy that establishes human superiority. Humans alone, he¶ reminds us, are aware and self-conscious beings who can act to fulfill the¶ objectives they set for themselves. Humans alone are able to **infuse the**¶ **world with their creative presence**, to overcome situations that limit them,¶ and thus to demonstrate a “decisive attitude towards the world” (p. 90). Freire (1990, pp. 87–91) represents other animals in terms of their **lack** of¶ such traits. They are doomed to passively accept the given, their lives¶ “totally determined” because their decisions belong not to themselves but¶ to their species. Thus whereas humans inhabit a “world” which they **create**¶ **and transform and from which they can separate themselves**, for animals¶ there is only habitat, a mere physical space to which they are “organically¶ bound.”¶ To accept Freire’s assumptions is to believe that humans are animals¶ only in a nominal sense. We are different not in degree but in kind, and¶ though we might recognize that other animals have distinct qualities, we¶ as humans are somehow **more unique.** We have the edge over other creatures because we are able to rise above **monotonous**, species-determined¶ biological existence. Change in the service of human freedom is seen to be¶ **our primary agenda.** Humans are thus cast as active agents whose very¶ essence is to **transform the world** – as if somehow acceptance, appreciation,¶ wonder, and reverence were beyond the pale.¶ This discursive frame of reference is characteristic of critical pedagogy.¶ The human/animal opposition upon which it rests is **taken for granted**, its¶ cultural and historical specificity **not acknowledged. And therein lies the**¶ **problem.** Like other social constructions, this one derives its persuasiveness¶ from its “seeming facticity and from the deep investments individuals and¶ communities have in setting themselves off from others” (Britzman et al.,¶ 1991, p. 91). This becomes the normal way of seeing the world, and like¶ other discourses of normalcy, it limits possibilities of taking up and confronting inequities (see Britzman, 1995). The primacy of the human enterprise is simply **not questioned.**¶ Precisely how an anthropocentric pedagogy might exacerbate the environmental crisis has not received much consideration in the literature¶ of critical pedagogy, especially in North America. Although there may be¶ passing reference to planetary destruction, there is seldom mention of the¶ relationship between education and the domination of nature, let alone any¶ sustained exploration of the links between the domination of nature and¶ other social injustices. Concerns about the nonhuman are **relegated** to¶ environmental education. And since environmental education, in turn,¶ remains peripheral to the core curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Russell, Bell,¶ & Fawcett, 2000), anthropocentrism passes unchallenged. ROOTS OF A CRITIQUE¶ Bowers (1993a, 1993b) has identified a number of root metaphors or “analogs” in critical pedagogy that reinforce the problem of anthropocentric¶ thinking. These include the notion of change as inherently progressive, faith in the power of rational thought, and an understanding of individuals¶ as “potentially free, voluntaristic entities who will take responsibility for¶ creating themselves when freed from societal forms of oppression” (1993a,¶ pp. 25–26). Such assumptions, argues Bowers, are part of the Enlightenment legacy on which critical pedagogy, and indeed liberal education¶ generally, is based. In other words, they are culturally specific and stem¶ from a period in Western history when the modern industrial world view¶ was beginning to take shape.¶ To be fair, Bowers understates the extent to which these assumptions are¶ being questioned within critical pedagogy (e.g., Giroux, 1995; Peters, 1995;¶ Shapiro, 1994; Weiler & Mitchell, 1992, pp. 1, 5). Nevertheless, his main¶ point is well taken: proponents of critical pedagogy have yet to confront¶ the ecological consequences of an educational process that reinforces beliefs¶ and practices formed when unlimited economic expansion and social¶ progress seemed promised (Bowers, 1993b, p. 3). What happens when the¶ expansion of human possibilities is equated with the possibilities of consumption? How is educating for freedom predicated on the exploitation of¶ the nonhuman? Such queries push against taken-for-granted understandings of human, nature, **self**, and community, and thus bring into focus the¶ underlying tension between “freedom” as it is constituted within critical¶ pedagogy and the limits that emerge through consideration of humans’¶ interdependence with the more-than-human world.¶ This tension is symptomatic of anthropocentrism. Humans are assumed¶ to be **free agents** separate from and pitted against the rest of nature, our¶ fulfillment predicated on overcoming material constraints. This assumption¶ of human difference and superiority, central to Western thought since¶ Aristotle (Abram, 1996, p. 77), has long been used to justify the exploitation¶ of nature by and for humankind (Evernden, 1992, p. 96). **It has also been**¶ **used to justify the exploitation of human groups (e.g., women, Blacks,**¶ **queers, indigenous peoples) deemed to be closer to nature – that is,**¶ **animalistic, irrational, savage, or uncivilized** (Gaard, 1997; Haraway, 1989,¶ p. 30; Selby, 1995, pp. 17–20; Spiegel, 1988).¶ This “organic apartheid” (Evernden, 1992, p. 119) is bolstered by the¶ belief that language is an exclusively human property that elevates mere¶ biological existence to meaningful, social existence. Understood in this¶ way, language undermines our embodied sense of interdependence with¶ a more-than-human world. Rather than being a point of entry into the webs¶ of communication all around us, language becomes a medium through¶ which we set ourselves **apart and above.**¶This view of language is deeply embedded in the conceptual framework¶ of critical pedagogy, including poststructuralist approaches. So too is the¶ human/nature dichotomy upon which it rests. When writers assume that “it is language that enables us to think, speak and give meaning to the¶ world around us,” that “meaning and consciousness do not exist outside¶ language” (Weedon, 1987, p. 32) and that “subjectivity is constructed by¶ and in language” (Luke & Luke, 1995, p. 378), then their transformative¶ projects are encoded so as to exclude any consideration of the nonhuman.¶ Such assumptions effectively remove all subjects from nature. As Evernden¶ (1992) puts it, “if subjectivity, willing, valuation, and meaning are securely¶ lodged in the domain of humanity, the possibility of encountering anything¶ more than material objects in nature is **nil**” (p. 108).¶ What is forgotten? What is erased when the real is equated with a¶ proliferating culture of commodified signs (see Luke & Luke, 1995, on¶ Baudrillard)? To begin, we forget that we humans are surrounded by an¶ astonishing diversity of life forms. We no longer perceive or give expression to a world in which everything has intelligence, personality, and¶ voice. Polyphonous echoes are reduced to homophony, a term Kane (1994)¶ uses to denote “the reduced sound of human language when it is used¶ under the assumption that speech is something belonging only to human¶ beings” (p. 192). We forget too what Abram (1996) describes as the gestural,¶ somatic dimension of language, its sensory and physical resonance that we¶ share with all expressive bodies (p. 80).

**Anthropocentrism guarantees violence—humanism is the *original* hierarchy—we need politics that can respect more than human life. Their politics dooms us to a future that endlessly repeats the oppression of the status quo.**

**Best 2007** (Steven – Chair of Philosophy @ University of Texas – El Paso, Review of Charles Patterson’s “The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust”, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, <http://www.drstevebest.org/EternalTriblenka.pdf>) //MD

While a welcome advance over the anthropocentric conceit that only humans shape human actions, the environmental determinism approach typically fails to emphasize the crucial role that animals play in human history, as well as how the human exploitation of animals is a key cause of hierarchy, social conflict, and environmental breakdown. A core thesis of what I call “animal standpoint theory” is that animals have been key driving and shaping forces of human thought, psychology, moral and social life, and history overall. More specifically, animal standpoint theory argues that **the oppression of human over human has deep roots in the oppression of human over animal.** ¶ In this context, Charles Patterson’s recent book, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, articulates the animal standpoint in a powerful form with revolutionary implications. The main argument of Eternal Treblinka is that **the human domination of animals, such as it emerged some ten thousand years ago with the rise of agricultural society, was the first hierarchical domination and laid the groundwork for patriarchy, slavery, warfare, genocide, and other systems of violence and power.** A key implication of Patterson’s theory is that human liberation is implausible if disconnected from animal liberation, and thus humanism -- a speciesist philosophy that constructs a hierarchal relationship privileging superior humans over inferior animals and reduces animals to resources for human use -- collapses under the weight of its logical contradictions. ¶ Patterson lays out his complex holistic argument in three parts. In Part I, he demonstrates that animal exploitation and speciesism have direct and profound connections to slavery, colonialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. In Part II, he shows how these connections exist not only in the realm of ideology – as conceptual systems of justifying and underpinning domination and hierarchy – but also in systems of technology, such that the tools and techniques humans devised for the rationalized mass confinement and slaughter of animals were mobilized against human groups for the same ends. Finally, in the fascinating interviews and narratives of Part III, Patterson describes how personal experience with German Nazism prompted Jewish to take antithetical paths: whereas most retreated to an insular identity and dogmatic emphasis on the singularity of Nazi evil and its tragic experience, others recognized the profound similarities between how Nazis treated their human captives and how humanity as a whole treats other animals, an epiphany that led them to adopt vegetarianism, to become advocates for the animals, and develop a far broader and more inclusive ethic informed by universal compassion for all suffering and oppressed beings.¶ The Origins of Hierarchy¶ "As long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other" –Pythagoras¶ It is little understood that **the first form of oppression, domination, and hierarchy involves human domination over animals.** Patterson’s thesis stands in bold contrast to the Marxist theory that the domination over nature is fundamental to the domination over other humans. It differs as well from the social ecology position of Murray Bookchin that domination over humans brings about alienation from the natural world, provokes hierarchical mindsets and institutions, and is the root of the long-standing western goal to “dominate” nature. In the case of Marxists, anarchists, and so many others, theorists typically don’t even mention human domination of animals, let alone assign it causal primacy or significance. In Patterson’s model, however, the human subjugation of animals is the first form of hierarchy and it paves the way for **all other systems of domination** such as include patriarchy, racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust. As he puts it, “the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples.” ¶ Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establish their dominance over animals through “domestication.” In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained increasing control over the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. To conquer, enslave, and claim animals as their own property, humans developed numerous technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons. The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson suggests, was modeled after the domestication of animals, such that men began to control women’s reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females. ¶ In the fifteenth century, **when Europeans began the colonization of Africa and Spain introduced the first international slave markets, the metaphors, models, and technologies used to exploit animal slaves were applied with equal cruelty and force to human slaves.** Stealing Africans from their native environment and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains around slaves’ bodies, shipping them in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skin with a hot iron to mark them as property, auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers – all these horrors and countless others inflicted on black slaves were developed and perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation. ¶ As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society, humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview – that came to be known as the “Great Chain of Being” – used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means. ¶ Patterson underscores the crucial point that the domination of human over human and its exercise through slavery, warfare, and genocide typically begins with the denigration of victims. But the means and methods of dehumanization are derivative, for **speciesism provided the conceptual paradigm that encouraged, sustained, and justified western brutality toward other peoples.** “Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species,” Patterson writes, “our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animals and do the same to them.” Whether the conquerors are European imperialists, American colonialists, or German Nazis, western aggressors engaged in wordplay before swordplay, vilifying their victims – Africans, Native Americans, Filipinos, Japanese, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and other unfortunates – with opprobrious terms such as “rats,” “pigs,” “swine,” “monkeys,” “beasts,” and “filthy animals.” ¶ Once perceived as brute beasts or sub-humans occupying a lower evolutionary rung than white westerners, subjugated peoples were treated accordingly; once characterized as animals, they could be hunted down like animals. The first exiles from the moral community, animals provided a convenient discard bin for oppressors to dispose the oppressed. The connections are clear: “For a civilization built on the exploitation and slaughter of animals, the `lower’ and more degraded the human victims are, the easier it is to kill them.” Thus, colonialism, as Patterson describes, was a “natural extension of human supremacy over the animal kingdom.” For just as humans had subdued animals with their superior intelligence and technologies, so many Europeans believed that the white race had proven its superiority by bringing the “lower races” under its command. ¶ There are important parallels between speciesism and sexism and racism in the elevation of white male rationality to the touchstone of moral worth. The arguments European colonialists used to legitimate exploiting Africans – that they were less than human and inferior to white Europeans in ability to reason – are the very same justifications humans use to trap, hunt, confine, and kill animals. Once western norms of rationality were defined as the essence of humanity and social normality, by first using non-human animals as the measure of alterity, it was a short step to begin viewing odd, different, exotic, and eccentric peoples and types as non- or sub-human. Thus, the same criterion created to exclude animals from humans was also used to ostracize blacks, women, and numerous other groups from “humanity.” The oppression of blacks, women, and animals alike was grounded in an argument that biological inferiority predestined them for servitude. In the major strain of western thought, alleged rational beings (i.e., elite, white, western males) pronounce that the Other (i.e., women, people of color, animals) is deficient in rationality in ways crucial to their nature and status, and therefore are deemed and treated as inferior, subhuman, or nonhuman. Whereas the racist mindset creates a hierarchy of superior/inferior on the basis of skin color, and the sexist mentality splits men and women into greater and lower classes of beings, the speciesist outlook demeans and objectifies animals by dichotomizing the biological continuum into the antipodes of humans and animals. As racism stems from a hateful white supremacism, and sexism is the product of a bigoted male supremacism, so speciesism stems from and informs a violent human supremacism -- namely, the arrogant belief that humans have a natural or God-given right to use animals for any purpose they devise or, more generously, within the moral boundaries of welfarism and stewardship, which however was Judaic moral baggage official Christianity left behind.¶

**Our alternative is to endorse the thought experiment of the voluntary global suicide of humanity – that solves**

**Kochi and Ordan 08** – (Dec. 2008, Tarik Kochi, PhD, Lecturer in Law & International Security, University of Sussex, Noam Ordan, linguist and translator, conducts research in Translation Studies at Bar Ilan University, research focus on human cultural history, “An argument for the global suicide of humanity,” Borderlands, <http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol7no3_2008/kochiordan_argument.pdf>)

For some, guided by the pressure of moral conscience or by a practice of harm minimisation, the appropriate response to historical and contemporary environmental destruction is that of action guided by abstention. For example, one way of reacting to mundane, everyday complicity is the attempt to abstain or opt-out of certain aspects of modern, industrial society: to not eat non-human animals, to invest ethically, to buy organic produce, to not use cars and buses, to live in an environmentally conscious commune. Ranging from small personal decisions to the establishment of parallel economies (think of organic and fair trade products as an attempt to set up a quasi-parallel economy), a typical modern form of action is that of a refusal to be complicit in human practices that are violent and destructive. Again, however, at a practical level, to what extent are such acts of nonparticipation rendered banal by their complicity in other actions? In a grand register of violence and harm the individual who abstains from eating non-human animals but still uses the bus or an airplane or electricity has only opted out of some harm causing practices and remains fully complicit with others. One response, however, which bypasses the problem of complicity and the banality of action is to take the non-participation solution to its most extreme level. In this instance, the only way to truly be non-complicit in the violence of the human heritage would be to opt-out altogether. Here, then, the modern discourse of reflection, responsibility and action runs to its logical conclusion – the global suicide of humanity – as a free-willed and ‘final solution’. While we are not interested in the discussion of the ‘method’ of the global suicide of humanity per se, one method that would be the least violent is that of humans choosing to no longer reproduce. [10] The case at point here is that the global suicide of humanity would be a moral act; it would take humanity out of the equation of life on this earth and remake the calculation for the benefit of everything nonhuman. While suicide in certain forms of religious thinking is normally condemned as something which is selfish and inflicts harm upon loved ones, the global suicide of humanity would be the highest act of altruism. That is, global suicide would involve the taking of responsibility for the destructive actions of the human species. By eradicating ourselves we end the long process of inflicting harm upon other species and offer a human-free world. If there is a form of divine intelligence then surely the human act of global suicide will be seen for what it is: a profound moral gesture aimed at redeeming humanity. Such an act is an offer of sacrifice to pay for past wrongs that would usher in a new future. Through the death of our species we will give the gift of life to others. It should be noted nonetheless that our proposal for the global suicide of humanity is based upon the notion that such a radical action needs to be voluntary and not forced. In this sense, and given the likelihood of such an action not being agreed upon, it operates as a thought experiment which may help humans to radically rethink what it means to participate in modern, moral life within the natural world. In other words, whether or not the act of global suicide takes place might well be irrelevant. What is more important is the form of critical reflection that an individual needs to go through before coming to the conclusion that the global suicide of humanity is an action that would be worthwhile. The point then of a thought experiment that considers the argument for the global suicide of humanity is the attempt to outline an anti-humanist, or non-human-centric ethics. Such an ethics attempts to take into account both sides of the human heritage: the capacity to carry out violence and inflict harm and the capacity to use moral reflection and creative social organisation to minimise violence and harm. Through the idea of global suicide such an ethics reintroduces a central question to the heart of moral reflection: To what extent is the value of the continuation of human life worth the total harm inflicted upon the life of all others? Regardless of whether an individual finds the idea of global suicide abhorrent or ridiculous, this question remains valid and relevant and will not go away, no matter how hard we try to forget, suppress or repress it.

### Advantage

#### Cuba’s environment is protected now but normalizing trade relations leads to massive increase in investment and tourism in Cuba – devastates the unique ecological environment

Dean, 7 - science writer for the New York Times, taught seminars and courses at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism and Vassar College, and the University of Rhode Island, member of the Corporation of Brown University, a founding member of the advisory board of the Metcalf Institute for Marine and Environmental Reporting (Cornelia, “Published: Conserving Cuba, After the Embargo”, December 25, 2007 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/25/science/25cuba.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=1&)

Through accidents of geography and history, **Cuba is a priceless ecological resource**. That is why many scientists are so worried about what will become of it after Fidel Castro and his associates leave power and, as is widely anticipated, the American government relaxes or ends its trade embargo. The New York Times Cuba has **avoided much environmental degradation in recent decades,** but now hotel developments are seen extending into the water in Cayo Coco. More Photos > Cuba, by far the region’s largest island, sits at the confluence of the Atlantic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. Its mountains, forests, swamps, coasts and marine areas are rich in plants and animals, **some seen nowhere else.** And since the imposition of the embargo in 1962, and especially with the collapse in 1991 of the Soviet Union, its major economic patron, Cuba’s economy has stagnated. Cuba has not been free of development, includig Soviet-style top-down agricultural and mining operations and, in recent years, an expansion of tourism. But it also has an abundance of landscapes that elsewhere in the region have been ripped up, paved over, poisoned or otherwise destroyed in the decades since the Cuban revolution, when development has been most intense. Once the embargo ends, the island could face a flood of investors from the United States and elsewhere, **eager to exploit those landscapes.** Conservationists, environmental lawyers and other experts, from Cuba and elsewhere, met last month in Cancún, Mexico, to discuss the island’s resources and how to continue to protect them. Cuba has done “what we should have done — identify your hot spots of biodiversity and set them aside,” said Oliver Houck, a professor of environmental law at Tulane University Law School who attended the conference. In the late 1990s, Mr. Houck was involved in an effort, financed in part by the MacArthur Foundation, to advise Cuban officials writing new environmental laws. But, he said in an interview, **“an invasion of U.S. consumerism, a U.S.-dominated future, could roll over it like a bulldozer” when the embargo ends.** By some estimates, tourism in Cuba is increasing 10 percent annually. At a minimum, Orlando Rey Santos, the Cuban lawyer who led the law-writing effort, said in an interview at the conference, “we can guess that tourism is going to increase in a very fast way” when the embargo ends. “It is estimated we could double tourism in one year,” said Mr. Rey, who heads environmental efforts at the Cuban ministry of science, technology and environment. About 700 miles long and about 100 miles wide at its widest, Cuba runs from Haiti west almost to the Yucatán Peninsula of Mexico. It offers crucial habitat for birds, like Bicknell’s thrush, whose summer home is in the mountains of New England and Canada, and the North American warblers that stop in Cuba on their way south for the winter. Zapata Swamp, on the island’s southern coast, may be notorious for its mosquitoes, but it is also known for its fish, amphibians, birds and other creatures. Among them is the Cuban crocodile, which has retreated to Cuba from a range that once ran from the Cayman Islands to the Bahamas. Cuba has the most biologically diverse populations of freshwater fish in the region. Its relatively large underwater coastal shelves are crucial for numerous marine species, including some whose larvae can be carried by currents into waters of the United States, said Ken Lindeman, a marine biologist at Florida Institute of Technology. Dr. Lindeman, who did not attend the conference but who has spent many years studying Cuba’s marine ecology, said in an interview that some of these creatures were important commercial and recreational species like the spiny lobster, grouper or snapper. Like corals elsewhere, those in Cuba are suffering as global warming raises ocean temperatures and acidity levels. And like other corals in the region, they reeled when a mysterious die-off of sea urchins left them with algae overgrowth. But they have largely escaped damage from pollution, boat traffic and destructive fishing practices. Diving in them “is like going back in time 50 years,” said David Guggenheim, a conference organizer and an ecologist and member of the advisory board of the Harte Research Institute, which helped organize the meeting along with the Center for International Policy, a private group in Washington. In a report last year, the World Wildlife Fund said that “in dramatic contrast” to its island neighbors, Cuba’s beaches, mangroves, reefs, seagrass beds and other habitats were relatively well preserved. **Their biggest threat**, the report said, was “th**e prospect of sudden and massive growth in mass tourism when the U.S. embargo lifts.”**

#### Tolerating the destruction of this ecosystem enables devaluation of all life

**Bookchin, 87** – co-founder of the Institute of Social Ecology, 1987 (Murray, “An Appeal For Social and Psychological Sanity," *The Modern Crisis*, Published by Black Rose Books Ltd., ISBN 0920057624, p. 106-108)

Industrially and technologically, we are moving at an ever-accelerating pace toward a yawning chasm with our eyes completely blindfolded. From the 1950s onward, we have placed ecological burdens upon our planet that have no precedent in human history. Our impact on our environment has been nothing less than appalling. The problems raised by acid rain alone are striking examples of [end page 106] innumerable problems that appear everywhere on our planet. The concrete-like clay layers, impervious to almost any kind of plant growth, replacing dynamic soils that once supported lush rain forests remain stark witness to a massive erosion of soil in all regions north and south of our equatorial belt. The equator—a cradle not only of our weather like the ice caps but a highly complex network of animal and plant life—is being denuded to a point where vast areas of the region look like a barren moonscape. We no longer "cut" our forests—that celebrated "renewable resource" for fuel, timber, and paper. We sweep them up like dust with a rapidity and "efficiency" that renders any claims to restorative action mere media-hype. Our entire planet is thus becoming simplified, not only polluted. Its soil is turning into sand. Its stately forests are rapidly being replaced by tangled weeds and scrub, that is, where vegetation in any complex form can be sustained at all. Its wildlife ebbs and flows on the edge of extinction, dependent largely on whether one or two nations—or governmental administrations—agree that certain sea and land mammals, bird species, or, for that matter, magnificent trees are "worth" rescuing as lucrative items on corporate balance sheets. With each such loss, humanity, too, loses a portion of its own character structure: its sensitivity toward life as such, including human life, and its rich wealth of sensibility. If we can learn to ignore the destiny of whales and condors—indeed, turn their fate into chic cliches—we can learn to ignore the destiny of Cambodians in Asia, Salvadorans in Central America, [end page 107] and, finally, the human beings who people our communities. If we reach this degree of degradation, we will then become so spiritually denuded that we will be capable of ignoring the terrors of thermonuclear war. Like the biotic ecosystems we have simplified with our lumbering and slaughtering technologies, we will have simplified the psychic ecosystems that give each of us our personal uniqueness. We will have rendered our internal mileau as homogenized and lifeless as our external milieu—and a biocidal war will merely externalize the deep sleep that will have already claimed our spiritual and moral integrity. The process of simplification, even more significantly than pollution, threatens to destroy the restorative powers of nature and humanity—their common ability to efface the forces of destruction and reclaim the planet for life and fecundity. Ahumanity disempowered of its capacity to change a misbegotten "civilization," ultimately divested of its power to resist, reflects a natural world disempowered of its capacity to reproduce a green and living world.

#### The notion that travel is essential to deliberative democracy relegates those with mobility disabilities to the periphery and reinforces ablenormative structures.

Imrie, 2000 – University of London Geography Professor

(Rob Imrie, January 6, 2000 Environment and Planning A 2000, volume 32, Disability and discourses of mobility and movement <http://www.envplan.com/abstract.cgi?id=a331> pg. 1641-1642 accessed 7-6-12 BC)

The inequities of mobility and movement are connected to sociocultural values and practices which prioritise mobile bodies or those characterised by societally defined norms of health, fitness, and independence of bodily movements. Such bodies are, as Ellis (2000, page 5) notes, ``naturalised as a biological given'' and projected as ``the legitimate basis of order in a humanist world''. Illustrative of this are the plethora of metaphors of mobility and movement which are infused with conceptions of bodily completeness and independence, of the (normal) body far removed from those with physical and mental impairments. Such representations counterpoise the mobile body to the immobile, the capacitated to the incapacitated, the abled to the disabled, and the normal to the abnormal. These binary divides reinforce what Oliver (1990) refers to as a ``legacy of negativism'', or values which mark out disabled people as ``problems because they are seen to deviate from the dominant culture's view of what is desirable, normal, socially acceptable, and safe'' (Corker, 1999, page 20; in addition, see Abberley, 1987; Paterson and Hughes, 1999).

#### The understanding of democracy in the 1AC is incomplete and erases disability – expanding democratic theory to account for different forms of embodiment is key

Clifford, 11 (Stacy, “Making disability public in deliberative democracy”, Contemporary Political Theory (2012) 11, 211–228. doi:10.1057/cpt.2011.11; published online 26 July 2011)

Disabled speech affects persons who are **refused the opportunity** to speak because their mode of communication defies reasonable and coherent standards; others who are capable of communication but are presumed incompetent; those able to speak but systematically misinterpreted; and individuals who are physically unable to speak. People with disabilities fall into all four categories and I use their experiences as a way to challenge conceptions of speech in deliberative democratic theory. Informed by disability studies and the disability rights movement, my analysis detaches disability from a medical model that interprets impairment as bodily pathology, and instead emphasizes the disabling consequences of able-bodied social norms and environments (Shakespeare, 2006). By emphasizing the ideal of inclusion, this article differentiates between liberal and critical strands of deliberative theory. According to Denise Walsh, ‘critical deliberative theorists argue that “the best of democratic norms” are **not reasonableness, rationality, and consensus**, but **openness and inclusiveness** that embrace contestation’ (2011, p. 8). For critical deliberative theorists, liberal requirements of rationality and consensus enact **unjust forms of exclusions**. While critical deliberative theorists contest the boundaries of legitimate speech and at times provide examples of non-verbal participation (Benhabib, 1992; Langsdorf, 2000; Young, 2000; Walsh, 2011), they have yet to fully theorize non-verbal speech acts as an integral component of deliberative theory. Significantly, I conceptualize both the meaning of deliberative theory and the space of deliberation broadly. Deliberative locations can include legislative or judicial discussions around disability, conferences convened specifically around disability rights, self-advocacy groups for people with disabilities and local boards of developmental disabilities. Revising our conception of speech is important as people with cognitive **disabilities continue to struggle for inclusion in these formal locations of deliberation**. But while these formal avenues of inclusion are important, revising negative stereotypes of disability may just as likely occur in informal interactions of everyday talk (Mansbridge, 1999). Deliberative theory, once revised, can encourage informal and formal public confrontations of difference to overturn negative assumptions surrounding disability.

Their idea of deliberative democracy is flawed—understanding of disability is a prerequisite to solvency

Longmore, 9 – professor of history and director of the Institute on Disability

(Paul K.,“Making Disability and Essential Part of American History,” Organization of American Historians Magazine of History, Volume: 23, Issue 3, 2009, P. 14, LPS).

Expanding on Baynton's valuable observations, history teachers and historians would do well to consider the role of issues and ideologies pertaining to disability and people with disabilities in the rise of the modern American state. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, political leaders and policymakers, as well as medical, education, charity, and social service professionals, sought to address disability as a social problem in a range of policy arenas: social welfare, public health, public schooling, warfare, and immigration. Not only is an understanding of disability necessary for full comprehension of the histories of each of these policy areas, but the presence of disability-related issues in each of them should alert us to the linkage between the histories of disability and modern state formation. For example, Theda Skocpol's Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: the Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States traces the central role of disability pensions for Union Army Civil War veterans in the historical evolution of federal social welfare policies (14). The work of scholars such as Skocpol demonstrates that we cannot fully and adequately explain the rise of the modern American state without examining the function of “disability” in its development.

#### Ableism is an oppressive structure of domination that must be rejected.

Siebers, 9 - University of Michigan, Professor of Literary and Cultural Criticism, Tobin (“The Aesthetics of Human Disqualification”, Oct 28, Lecture, <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCoQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdisabilities.temple.edu%2Fmedia%2Fds%2Flecture20091028siebersAesthetics_FULL.doc&ei=LWz4T6jyN8bHqAHLkY2LCQ&usg=AFQjCNGdkDuSJkRXMHgbXqvuyyeDpldVcQ&sig2=UCGDC4tHbeh2j7-Yce9lsA>, accessed 7/7/12 Ajones)

Oppression is the systematic victimization of one group by another. It is a form of intergroup violence. That oppression involves “groups,” and not “individuals,” means that it concerns identities, and this means, furthermore, that oppression always focuses on how the body appears, both on how it appears as a public and physical presence and on its specific and various appearances. Oppression is justified most often by the attribution of natural inferiority—what some call “in-built” or “biological” inferiority. Natural inferiority is always somatic, focusing on the mental and physical features of the group, and it figures as disability. The prototype of biological inferiority is disability. The representation of inferiority always comes back to the appearance of the body and the way the body makes other bodies feel. This is why the study of oppression requires an understanding of aesthetics—not only because oppression uses aesthetic judgments for its violence but also because the signposts of how oppression works are visible in the history of art, where aesthetic judgments about the creation and appreciation of bodies are openly discussed.

One additional thought must be noted before I treat some analytic examples from the historical record. First, despite my statement that disability now serves as the master trope of human disqualification, it is not a matter of reducing other minority identities to disability identity. Rather, it is a matter of understanding the work done by disability in oppressive systems. In disability oppression, the physical and mental properties of the body are socially constructed as disqualifying defects, but this specific type of social construction happens to be integral at the present moment to the symbolic requirements of oppression in general. In every oppressive system of our day, I want to claim, the oppressed identity is represented in some way as disabled, and although it is hard to understand, the same process obtains when disability is the oppressed identity. “Racism” disqualifies on the basis of race, providing justification for the inferiority of certain skin colors, bloodlines, and physical features. “Sexism” disqualifies on the basis of sex/gender as a direct representation of mental and physical inferiority. “Classism” disqualifies on the basis of family lineage and socioeconomic power as proof of inferior genealogical status. “Ableism” disqualifies on the basis of mental and physical differences, first selecting and then stigmatizing them as disabilities. The oppressive system occults in each case the fact that the disqualified identity is socially constructed, a mere convention, representing signs of incompetence, weakness, or inferiority as undeniable facts of nature.

As racism, sexism, and classism fall away slowly as justifications for human inferiority—and the critiques of these prejudices prove powerful examples of how to fight oppression—the prejudice against disability remains in full force, providing seemingly credible reasons for the belief in human inferiority and the oppressive systems built upon it. This usage will continue, I expect, until we reach a historical moment when we know as much about the social construction of disability as we now know about the social construction of race, class, gender, and sexuality. Disability represents at this moment in time the final frontier of justifiable human inferiority.

### Framing

#### The personal is political

Colebrook, 2 (Claire Colebrook; Understanding Deleuze, Pg. xxxviii)

Human freedom became *the* problem. If human beings are free, does this mean that there is some ultimate ‘man’ who can be liberated from the forces of production; or does radical freedom mean that there is no longer any human essence to which politics can appeal? All this came to a head in the student sit-ins and disruptions of 1968. There were protests throughout Europe in the late 1960s which were random, unthought out, and motivated not by the economically defined class of workers so much as by students and intellectuals. In the aftermath of these disruptions it was realised that politics was no longer the affair of economic classes and large or ‘molar’ groupings. **Local disruptions** at the level of knowledge, ideas and identity could **transform the political terrain.** Deleuze and others opened the politics of the virtual: it was no longer accepted that actual material reality, such as the economy, produced ideas. Many insisted that the virtual (images, desires, concepts) was directly productive of social reality. This overturned the simple idea of ideology, the idea that images and beliefs were produced by the governing classes to deceive us about our real social conditions. We have to do away with the idea that there is some ultimate political reality or actuality which lies behind all our images. Images are not just surface effects of some underlying economic cause; images and the virtual have their own autonomous power. This is where structuralism and post-1968 politics intersected. We need to see our languages and systems of representation not just as masks or signs of the actual, but as fully real powers in their own right. The way we think, speak, desire and see the world is itself political; it produces relations, effects, and organises our bodies.

#### Already ceded

Neocleous 8Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, *Critique of Security*

Eliding the distinction between military practice and the everyday political administration of civil society thereby helps in ‘securing’ a general willingness among the citizenry to submit to wartime discipline and emergency powers on a permanent basis. It is this project of total war, total security and permanent emergency that requires the constant reiteration of the existence of fear and danger. Key ﬁgures in the national security state such as Nitze and Acheson came to use the various drafts of NSC documents, and especially NSC-68, to simultaneously promote more aggressive foreign policies and to frighten Americans into supporting those policies.35 By 1949 one Cold Warrior could openly employ a Kierke gaardian frame and state that the ‘reign of insecurity’ means that ‘anxiety is the ofﬁcial emotion of our time’.36 This anxiety permeated all the way through the national security state in the early Cold War and after. From panic over the Soviet Union to concern over the‘loss’ of China all the way down to‘the posture of the world’s most powerful state in the 1980s, a sumo wrestler, as it were, perched on a chair at the sight of a socialist Nicaraguan mouse appearing “on its doorstep” (which is to say, approximately the distance which separates London from Albania)’,37 the national security state has constantly exhibited one insecurity, fear or anxiety after another, turning the entire social symbolic system surrounding national security into the alter image of a collectively anticipated spectacle of disaster.38 In peddling the fear of disintegration and crisis, the ideology of security is the paranoid style in politics writ large. Writing about this paranoid style, both Richard Hofstadter and E. H. Gombrich have noted that unlike the clinically paranoid person who sees the hostile and conspiratorial world in which he is living as directed against him, the spokespersons of the paranoid style ﬁnd it directed against a nation, a culture, a way of life. In its most abstract mode this style involves the constant scanning of the social and political environment for signs conﬁrming the wicked threat, and involves imaginative leaps conjuring up a vast and sinister conspiracy, a huge and hidden machinery of inﬂuence set in motion to undermine and destroy a way of life. The style also tends to be convinced that the nation is infused with a terror network of enemy agents taking over the institutions of civil society in a concerted effort to paralyse the resistance of loyal citizens.39 If we see in paranoia a type of investment of a social formation, as Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari suggest, then one can read a politics structured around security as deeply paranoid.40 I have shown elsewhere how this style also operates with the metaphor of disease, with the health of the body politic supposedly being ruined by the ‘disease’ of communism: ‘world communism is like a malignant parasite’, says Kennan, ‘which feeds only on diseased tissue’ while the Soviet Union ‘bear[s] within itself germs of creeping disease’.41 We might add here that such disease is also a form of dis-ease – a profound insecurity about the state, its mode of accumulation, and its place in world order. The ideology of national security is in this sense both hypochondriac and paranoid. In both hypochondria and paranoia, perception is as important as reality. John Lewis Gaddis notes that by around 1950 key ﬁgures in the US were coming to the view that because insecurity could manifest itself in psychological as well as physical terms it could have a wide and indeterminate range of sources, and the implications of this were startling: ‘world order, and with it American security, had come to depend as much on perceptions of the balance of power as on what that balance actually was’. This was not just a question of the perceptions of statesmen and generals: ‘they reﬂected as well mass opinion, foreign as well as domestic, informed as well as uninformed, rational as well as irrational.’42 The Cold War, as an ‘imaginary war’43 was to therefore be a war of the imagination. To win this war meant disciplining (and, as we shall shortly see, punishing) the imagination, a process which centred on the constant reiteration of national (in)security. Indeed, one might say that if we are talking about the human imagination and its fears, then there is nothing that might not be transformed into a ‘clear and present danger’, and thus nothing that might escape becoming a security issue. The national security state would simultaneously be the national insecurity state – permanently. At ﬁrst sight such a reading might appear to suggest a problem for states: after all, surely anxiety, fear and insecurity are bad? But for the party of order and security, disorder and insecurity always have their uses. If, as Kennan once put it, ‘complete security . . . will never be achieved’,44 and if insecurity is driven by myriad fears, myths and purported dangers, then what better way to develop and embellish the national security state, and to justify the constant re-ordering of domestic civil society and international order, than to encouragethose very fears and insecurities in the ﬁrst place? As one of the major supporters and prime movers behind the Marshall Plan, Senator Vandenberg, put it, the administration really had to ‘scare hell out of the American people’.45 The manipulation of insecurity thus becomes a primary stake in the struggle for power and the exercise of domination. This is foreign policy as a discourse of danger and an evangelism of fear.46 The real danger is then less the feeling of insecurity and much more that the people might not be sufﬁciently afraid. This is perhaps partly what the authors of NSC-68 meant when they stated that even if there were no Soviet threat, the same policy would probably be pursued. In this sense the Cold War might be read as a mutually agreeable explanation for the constant reiteration of the need for security and the permanent ‘improvement’ of the security apparatus – on both sides. As Diana Johnstone and Ben Cramer put it writing about the more than 1,200 US bases in Europe throughout the Cold War,‘if the danger [of Soviet invasion] never really existed, then it can be argued that a primary mission of U.S. forces in Europe in reality has been to maintainthe Soviet threat . . . The Soviet and U.S “threats” maintained each other, and thus their double military hegemony over the European continent’.47This might also explain why the US spent a large proportion of the Cold War literally feeding its enemy, being one of the largest suppliers of wheat and coarse grains and other imports, as well as various loans and credits to Eastern European satellites. It would almost seem as if it the US needed the Soviet Union’s continued existence as tangible explanation for the anxiety it claimed to experience and as justiﬁcation for the national security state and the proliferation of one ‘security measure’ after another.48 And if it were to disappear then a replacement would have to be found: one must never allow the system to‘run out of demons’.49 Writing in 1953, after having lived through some of these key political developments in the US and having been engaged in debating with fascist political and legal theorists in Germany, Franz Neumann commented that the integrating element of liberal democ racy purports to be a moral one, whether it be freedom or justice. ‘But there is opposed to this a second integrating principle of a political system: fear of an enemy’. Such fear, he notes, is a key feature of fascist political thought, which ‘asserts that the creation of a national com munity is conditioned by the existence of an enemy whom one must be willing to exterminate physically’. His reference here is to Carl Schmitt’s Concept of the Political, in which Schmitt asserts that ‘the speciﬁc political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy’, a distinction which ‘denotes the utmost intensity of a union or separation, of an asso ciation or dissociation’ and which receives its real meaning by opening up the possibility of war and death.50 Neumann comments that when the concepts of ‘enemy’ and ‘fear’ come to constitute the energetic principles of politics, democracy becomes impossible and the system is ripe for dictatorship. We might add that this strategic deployment of fear is fundamental to the ideology of security. To help shape this fear and its deployment, the security state employed a rhetorical strategy focused on the moral ﬁbre and identity of the American people.51 NSC-68 presented a more or less standard version of American exceptionalism rooted in the unquestioned virtues of the American way of life. The opening sections of the topsecret national security memorandum in particular go to some lengths to outline and elaborate the key differences between‘the fundamental purpose of the US’, namely freedom, and‘the fundamental design of the Kremlin’, namely slavery. The idea of‘freedom’ was reiterated via one of the standard tropes in nationalist discourse, namely by invoking the bonds of community between the living and the dead embodied in the authority of the Constitution, thereby situating the national security state in the context of a long American tradition.52 The assertion of this identity was consciously linked to the authori tative texts that were/are invoked in US political discourse to silence dissent and to continually reafﬁrm the benevolence of the American idea of freedom. NSC-68 and related national security documents from the period are replete with references to the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, The Federalist, God-given rights,53 and the historical duties of America. Just as Roosevelt in the mid-1930s had argued that the freedoms Americans so cherished required the kind of social security he was planning to offer, so now national security was to be thought of in the same terms. This (re-)imagined community of America was then used to distinguish ‘American identity’ from the ‘other’ – between ‘us’ and ‘them’; ‘good’ versus ‘evil’; the US as a ‘country’ compared to the USSR as a ‘fortress’; the ‘marvelous diversity, deep tolerance and lawfulness of the free society’ compared to the ‘slave state’; and so on – in a prime expression of the ways in which the politics of security is inextricably bound up with the technologies of cultural difference and an exemplary case of identity as a strategy of containment. This American identity was seen as an outcome of the exceptional and consensual nature of American history, which had to be re-imagined in such a way that obfuscated its former reliance on the slave trade, its relationship with Nazi Germany, its early positive relationship with the Soviet regime and its willing ness to happily agree with the Soviet leadership at Yalta in 1945 about how to divide Europe and share the spoils in East Asia. In an exem plary instance of history as ideology, American political and cultural ‘tradition’ would thereby be placed in a different moral universe from the‘slavery’ of the Communist system.54

## 2NC

### 2NC OV

Anthropocentrism outweighs – it makes ecocide inevitable – try or die for the neg

Gottlieb 94 — Roger S. Gottlieb, Professor of Humanities at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Brandeis University, 1994 (“Ethics and Trauma: Levinas, Feminism, and Deep Ecology,” *Crosscurrents: A Journal of Religion and Intellectual Life*, Summer, Available Online at http://www.crosscurrents.org/feministecology.htm, Accessed 07-26-2011)

Here I will at least begin in agreement with Levinas. As he rejects an ethics proceeding on the basis of self-interest, so I believe the anthropocentric perspectives of conservation or liberal environmentalism cannot take us far enough. Our relations with nonhuman nature are poisoned and not just because we have set up feedback loops that already lead to mass starvations, skyrocketing environmental disease rates, and devastation of natural resources. The problem with ecocide is not just that it hurts human beings. Our uncaring violence also violates the very ground of our being, our natural body, our home. Such violence is done not simply to the other – as if the rainforest, the river, the atmosphere, the species made extinct are totally different from ourselves. Rather, we have crucified ourselves-in-relation-to-the-other, fracturing a mode of being in which self and other can no more be conceived as fully in isolation from each other than can a mother and a nursing child. We are that child, and nonhuman nature is that mother. If this image seems too maudlin, let us remember that other lactating women can feed an infant, but we have only one earth mother. What moral stance will be shaped by our personal sense that we are poisoning ourselves, our environment, and so many kindred spirits of the air, water, and forests? To begin, we may see this tragic situation as setting the limits to Levinas's perspective. The other which is nonhuman nature is not simply known by a "trace," nor is it something of which all knowledge is necessarily instrumental. This other is inside us as well as outside us. We prove it with every breath we take, every bit of food we eat, every glass of water we drink. We do not have to find shadowy traces on or in the faces of trees or lakes, topsoil or air: we are made from them. Levinas denies this sense of connection with nature. Our "natural" side represents for him a threat of simple consumption or use of the other, a spontaneous response which must be obliterated by the power of ethics in general (and, for him in particular, Jewish religious law(23) ). A "natural" response lacks discipline; without the capacity to heed the call of the other, unable to sublate the self's egoism. Worship of nature would ultimately result in an "everything-is-permitted" mentality, a close relative of Nazism itself. For Levinas, to think of people as "natural" beings is to assimilate them to a totality, a category or species which makes no room for the kind of individuality required by ethics.(24) He refers to the "elemental" or the "there is" as unmanaged, unaltered, "natural" conditions or forces that are essentially alien to the categories and conditions of moral life.(25) One can only lament that Levinas has read nature -- as to some extent (despite his intentions) he has read selfhood -- through the lens of masculine culture. It is precisely our sense of belonging to nature as system, as interaction, as interdependence, which can provide the basis for an ethics appropriate to the trauma of ecocide. As cultural feminism sought to expand our sense of personal identity to a sense of inter-identification with the human other, so this ecological ethics would expand our personal and species sense of identity into an inter-identification with the natural world. Such a realization can lead us to an ethics appropriate to our time, a dimension of which has come to be known as "deep ecology."(26) For this ethics, we do not begin from the uniqueness of our human selfhood, existing against a taken-for-granted background of earth and sky. Nor is our body somehow irrelevant to ethical relations, with knowledge of it reduced always to tactics of domination. Our knowledge does not assimilate the other to the same, but reveals and furthers the continuing dance of interdependence. And our ethical motivation is neither rationalist system nor individualistic self-interest, but a sense of connection to all of life. The deep ecology sense of self-realization goes beyond the modern Western sense of "self" as an isolated ego striving for hedonistic gratification. . . . . Self, in this sense, is experienced as integrated with the whole of nature.(27) Having gained distance and sophistication of perception [from the development of science and political freedoms] we can turn and recognize who we have been all along. . . . we are our world knowing itself. We can relinquish our separateness. We can come home again -- and participate in our world in a richer, more responsible and poignantly beautiful way.(28) Ecological ways of knowing nature are necessarily participatory. [This] knowledge is ecological and plural, reflecting both the diversity of natural ecosystems and the diversity in cultures that nature-based living gives rise to. The recovery of the feminine principle is based on inclusiveness. It is a recovery in nature, woman and man of creative forms of being and perceiving. In nature it implies seeing nature as a live organism. In woman it implies seeing women as productive and active. Finally, in men the recovery of the feminine principle implies a relocation of action and activity to create life-enhancing, not life-reducing and life-threatening societies.(29) In this context, the knowing ego is not set against a world it seeks to control, but one of which it is a part. To continue the feminist perspective, the mother knows or seeks to know the child's needs. Does it make sense to think of her answering the call of the child in abstraction from such knowledge? Is such knowledge necessarily domination? Or is it essential to a project of care, respect and love, precisely because the knower has an intimate, emotional connection with the known?(30) Our ecological vision locates us in such close relation with our natural home that knowledge of it is knowledge of ourselves. And this is not, contrary to Levinas's fear, reducing the other to the same, but a celebration of a larger, more inclusive, and still complex and articulated self.(31) The noble and terrible burden of Levinas's individuated responsibility for sheer existence gives way to a different dream, a different prayer: Being rock, being gas, being mist, being Mind, Being the mesons traveling among the galaxies with the speed of light, You have come here, my beloved one. . . . You have manifested yourself as trees, as grass, as butterflies, as single-celled beings, and as chrysanthemums; but the eyes with which you looked at me this morning tell me you have never died.(32) In this prayer, we are, quite simply, all in it together. And, although this new ecological Holocaust -- this creation of planet Auschwitz – is under way, it is not yet final. We have time to step back from the brink, to repair our world. But only if we see that world not as another across an irreducible gap of loneliness and unchosen obligation, but as a part of ourselves as we are part of it, to be redeemed not out of duty, but out of love; neither for ourselves nor for the other, but for us all.

### 2NC AT: Perm

The alt is a pre-requisite – legal approaches reinforces anthropocentrism

Burdon 12 (Peter Burdon – PhD in Earth Jurisprudence and lecturer at Alelaide Law School, August 10, 2010, “ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE LIMITS OF RIGHTS TALK”, http://rightnow.org.au/topics/environment/environmental-protection-and-the-limits-of-rights-talk/) //MD

Yet, the limitations of the rights of nature discourse must also be borne in mind. Its reliance on legal rights retains an individualistic perspective, which may be problematic when applied to integrated ecosystems. Further, **it is ultimately a quick legal fix, which** precludes **deeper questioning about social values and economic forms.** While I am sympathetic to the need for such a solution in the face of global ecosystemic collapse, I also wish to be clear that there is little hope for achieving radical social change by simply adding “rights of nature” to the catalogue of legally recognised rights. I think many advocates for the rights of nature would agree with me on that point. Indeed, failing to recognise the limits of a rights discourse risks perpetuating an individualistic and market-orientated tradition which was foundational to the global environmental crisis in the first place.

### 2NC HR Link

Dichotomizing humans and nature turns the case – anthropocentrism ensures the dominant conception of “human rights” will only recreate violence

Lucas-Rose 06 (Rebecca Garcia Lucas-Rose – Trinity College, University of Melbourne, 2006, “Human Rights: ¶ An Earth-based Ethics”, http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/colloquy/download/colloquy\_issue\_12\_november\_2006/rose.pdf) //MD

At present, the extremity of environmental destruction is grossly and ¶ dangerously demonstrating the human attitude of superiority towards the ¶ other, and underlies the modern human-human relationship forged by epistemic hyperseparation. **An inclusion of humans into the prior construction of** ¶ **‘radical nonhuman other’ has escalated in the modern world**. These humans are identified and otherized as variously continuous with nonhuman ¶ nature and thereat discontinuous with the human. Human difference is ¶ constructed as radical difference. Human others have typically included ¶ people with ‘other’ skin colour or ‘other’ religions, cultures or languages, ¶ women, the poor, or minorities. In the interest of human rights then, our reconsideration of dominant modern epistemology, and its inherent epistemology of hyperseparation, should be unreserved. This reconsideration, ¶ then, involves challenging human/nonhuman, mind/nature, mind/body dualisms. ¶ **The ethical implications of centralizing the human-human relationship** ¶ **through an epistemology of hyperseparation are immense. Nonhumans are** ¶ **excluded from ethical concern on the premise that, as a human-human** ¶ **field, ethics is disengaged from the radically other.**19 Developing from an ¶ epistemic rejection of human-nonhuman interrelationship, and subsequently upon the radical exclusion of those classed as ‘other’, ethics is a ¶ flawed agency for human rights.¶ 20 As philosopher and sociologist Mick ¶ Smith puts it, “the ethical cannot be located entirely in the systemic interchanges between individual humans. Ethics also has to include our relations to nature; it is a lived multidimensional relation of care for natural (and ¶ human) others, a relation that originates in part from the environment itself.”21

### 2NC Futurism Link

**Sixth link is futurism --- their “politics of hope” reinforces a dominant conception of the future that entrenches humanism – THE ANIMAL HAS NO FUTURE**

Dell’Aversano 2010 (Carmen – English Department @ University of Pisa, “The Love Whose Name Cannot Be Spoken: Queering the Human-Animal Bond”, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, http://www.academia.edu/282300/The\_Love\_Whose\_Name\_Cannot\_Be\_Spoken\_Queering\_the\_Human-Animal\_Bond) //MD

And reciprocally, everything that concerns animals, however well-founded and urgent, by definition cannot make its way into political discourse. If the child is “the prop of the secular theology on which our social reality rests: the secular theology that shapes at once the meaning of our collective narratives and our collective narratives of meaning” (Edelman 12), the animal, as the prop for the performance of “dehumanization”, is the locus of the permanent denial of all meaning and relevance. If, as Edelman writes, queerness names the side of those not „fighting for the children‟, the side outside the consensus by which all politics confirms the absolute value of reproductive futurism. […] [while] queerness, by contrast, figures […] the place of the social order‟s death drive […] queerness attains its ethical value precisely insofar as it accedes to that place, accepting its figural status as resistance to the viability of the social (Edelman 2004: 3) nothing could be queerer than the love for animals, which, by its very nature, which entails a serious and irrevocable commitment to the dismantling of the performances and devices on which social order as such rests, “marks the „other‟ side of politics: […] the side outside all political sides, committed as they are, on every side, to futurism‟s unquestioned good” (Edelman 2004: 7). It is thus no coincidence that the fetish of the Child should be omnipresent in the many-sided polemic against animal rights. In public debates, anti-vivisection activists are routinely asked by experimenters whether they would rather kill a mouse or a child (the answer is, of course, neither); and every time the subject of animal rights is brought up not merely as a topic of academic discussion but in appeals for practical or Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume VIII, Issue 1/2, 2010 (ISSN1948-352X) 106 financial support, the most common form of refusal invariably brings up starving children as the more appropriate recipients of concern and aid. That the people who give this kind of answers do nothing whatsoever to relieve the plight of children in need does not matter rhetorically: what does matter is that the appeal for children “is impossible to refuse […] this issue, like an ideological Möbius strip, only permit[s] one side” (Edelman 2004 2).. And any animal queer human can, from systematic and bitter personal experience, agree with Edelman that this is “oppressively political […] insofar as the fantasy subtending the image of the Child invariably shapes the logic within which the political itself must be thought” (Edelman 2004 2). The emotions, feelings, thoughts and actions which make up the fabric of life for an animal queer person decentre the human and humanity from their positions as the taken-for granted subjects, and implicitly but powerfully question reproductive futurism. What Edelman calls the ideological limit on political discourse as such, preserving in the process the absolute privilege of heteronormativity, by rendering unthinkable, by casting outside the political domain, the possibility of a queer resistance to this organizing principle of human relations (Edelman 2004: 2) is shattered by an animal queer perspective. In its animal incarnation, more than in any other of its innumerable avatars, “[t]he queer comes to figure the bar to every realization of futurity, the resistance […] to every social structure or form” (Edelman 2004 4)”. And the real reason why liberalism grants a place to “the queer” in its LGBT incarnation but marginalizes, ridicules, represses and murders animal queer is that the denial and repression of “the queerness of resistance to futurism and thus the queerness of the queer” (Edelman 2004 27) are perfectly compatible with a civil rights perspective on same-sex love, but utterly incompatible with animal rights. An animal queer perspective is indeed [i]ntent on the end, not the ends, of the social, [...] insists that the drive toward that end, which liberalism refuses to imagine, can never be excluded from the structuring fantasy of the social order itself. (Edelman 2004: 28) The “deliberate[...] severing of us from ourselves” that Edelman (5) mentions as the hallmark of queer is implicit in the love for an animal. Animal queer severs us from Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume VIII, Issue 1/2, 2010 (ISSN1948-352X) 107 ourselves because it decentres our perspective: suddenly, other values, other interests, other feelings, though incommensurable and unimaginable, become equivalent to our own. The queerest expression of this attitude in the animal rights field (or, for that matter, anywhere, at least as far as I know...) is VHEMT, **the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement, which unwittingly but appropriately takes up Edelman’s challenge that “Queerness should and must redefine such notions as “civil order” through a rupturing of our foundational faith in the reproduction of futurity” (Edelman 2004 16-17) and embodies the only oppositional status to which our queerness could ever lead [which] would depend on us taking seriously the place of the death drive […] and insisting […] that we do not intend a new politics, a better society, a brighter tomorrow, since all of those fantasies reproduce the past, through displacement, in the form of the future**. (Edelman 2004 31) The Voluntary Human Extinction Movement Motto: “May we live long and die out” VHEMT (pronounced vehement) is a movement not an organization. It‟s a movement advanced by people who care about life on planet Earth. [...] As VHEMT Volunteers know, the hopeful alternative to the extinction of millions of species of plants and animals is the voluntary extinction of one species: Homo sapiens... us.[...] When every human chooses to stop breeding, Earth‟s biosphere will be allowed to return to its former glory, and all remaining creatures will be free to live, die, evolve (if they believe in evolution), and will perhaps pass away, as so many of Nature‟s “experiments” have done throughout the eons. It‟s going to take all of us going. At first glance, some people assume that VHEMT Volunteers and Supporters must hate people and that we want everyone to commit suicide or become victims of mass murder. It‟s easy to forget that another way to bring about a reduction in our numbers is to simply stop making more of us. Making babies seems to be a blind spot in our outlooks on life. (http://www.vhemt.org/) Instead of worshipping the Child as the guarantee of our own eternity in a future where progress will always confirm we were right, VHEMT calls for a voluntary and lucid renunciation of the Child both as a symbol and as a reality, and for restoring the beauty, glory and holiness of the planet by returning it to its rightful, non-human, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume VIII, Issue 1/2, 2010 (ISSN1948-352X) 108 owners, the ones who kept it for half a billion years without making a mess of it. The mission of VHEMT actualizes what Edelman wrote about: “the death drive names what the queer, in the order of the social, is called forth to figure: the negativity opposed to every form of social viability” (Edelman 2004 9). In envisioning a world where no opposition to the social will be necessary, because the social will no longer be a possibility, VHEMT radically refuses this mandate by which our political institutions compel the collective reproduction of the Child [and therefore] must appear as a threat not only to the organization of a given social order but also, and far more ominously, to social order as such, insofar as it threatens the order of futurism on which meaning always depends. (Edelman 2004: 11) Because of its refusal of any “identification both of and with the Child as the preeminent emblem of the motivating end, though one endlessly postponed, of every political vision as a vision of futurity”, VHEMT is the most coherent and most radical incarnation of “a queer oppositional politics” (Edelman 2004: 13).

### AT: roleplaying

Their politics causes passivity and destroys value to life

Antonio 95 (Robert J Antonio, PhD in sociology, professor of sociology at the University of Kansas, July 1995, “Nietzsche’s Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History,” *American Journal of Sociology* Volume 101 Number 1, GENDER MODIFIED)

According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass disci- pline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, ef- fecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, ap- pearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "re- markable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83).¶ The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrica- tions to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of oth- ers, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devas- tating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integ- rity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor?¶ A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring net- works of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others."¶ Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors am- plify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, ex- ploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great ~~man~~ [person] of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more ur- gently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

## 1NR

## Environment

#### Repeal of the embargo kills biodiversity – Cuba is a hotspot

PBS, 10 – Public Broadcasting Service, (“Cuba: The Accidental Eden A Brief Environmental History” Sep 27, 2010, www.pbs.org/wnet/nature/episodes/cuba-the-accidental-eden/a-brief-environmental-history/5830/)//ah

Cuba has been called the “Accidental Eden” for its **exceptional biodiversity** and unique historical development. The island nation and its archipelagos support thousands of plant and animal species, many of which are endemic, making Cuba the most naturally diverse Caribbean nation and a destination for biological scientists and ecotourists. Cuba’s natural blessings are the result of a manifold historical trajectory. The American trade and tourism embargo and the collapse of the Soviet Union have both made “accidental” contributions to the survival of Cuban wildlife. Cuba’s low population density (about 102 people per square kilometer) and relative land isolation as an island have afforded it moderately low levels of environmental destruction and high levels of endemism. And Cuba remains biologically diverse, but it has seen its share of loss. Spanish colonialism invited new plants, animals, and diseases, and some native lifeforms failed to cope. Species unique to Cuba became extinct, including varieties of sloths and monkeys, among other animals. The expansion of Cuban commercialism and industry, particularly with the influence of European and American capital, continued to threaten Cuban wildlife populations. Tobacco and more significantly sugar transformed the country from a Spanish shipping port to a major agricultural exporter. As sugar demand rose, habitat was destroyed for farming. Today, farmers still compete with wildlife for use of the land. At the same time, heavy industrial development polluted Cuban air, land, and water. Cuba’s 1959 revolution set the country on a path apart from other post-colonial nations. Although revolutionary Cuba instituted policies around agriculture, industry, forests, and water, like most states in the 1960s, its moderate environmental efforts had mixed results. Focusing more heavily on agriculture rather than heavy industry probably did more to save Cuban wildlife in the ‘60s and ‘70s than did any environmentally conscious policies. While global capitalism continued on a general course of thoughtless environmental destruction, the U.S. embargo against Cuba, including **a travel ban, freed the country from its most salient environmental threat** while putting the nation under great economic strain. Cuba traded and underwent forms of “development,” but in many ways avoided the developments of late century American capitalism. While both “capitalism” and “communism” ultimately undervalued natural resources, American executive and legislative dispositions helped nurture the blossoming of Cuban wildlife. A dramatic shift toward agriculture, industry, and the environment appeared after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. With shortages in fossil fuels and the disappearance of 80% of both imports and exports, Cuba entered the “Special Period,” an economic depression that required new techniques to help the country become more self-sustaining. Although Cuban beaches were opened to international tourism, an environmentally significant aspect of the Special Period was the adoption of permaculture agriculture and land use strategies. Circumstances since the ’90s have led the Cuban government to take a stronger legislative and rhetorical stance toward environmental management. Although initially centered around the human species, Fidel Castro’s 1992 address to the UN Earth Summit in Rio De Janeiro expresses this attitude of environmental awareness and urgency: “An important biological species is in danger of disappearing due to the fast and progressive destruction of its natural living conditions: mankind. We have now become aware of this problem when it is almost too late to stop it. … Tomorrow it will be too late to do what we should have done a long time ago.” Today Cuba exhibits thriving natural diversity, though it may be tenuous. Agricultural pollution, habitat destruction, and significantly tourism all threaten the island’s plants and animals and compete for land and water use. Every moment brings Cuba closer to the possibility of a lifted U.S. embargo, which would dramatically affect Cuba’s economic possibilities and thus its wildlife. One of the many mixed blessing would be increased tourism. Marine conservationist Fernando Bretos notes that “The tourism impact has really been minimal in Cuba, but that’s going to change. When you go from 2 million tourists a year to 4 to 6 to 8, everything will change.” Those with concern for Cuban wildlife but an understanding of the inevitable promote an ecotourism that focuses on enjoying and even actively supporting nature. This practice necessitates natural preservation, though potentially favoring certain species of flora and fauna over others. Mixed messages from officials make it unclear how Cuba’s tourism industry will proceed, but some conservationists see Cuba’s position as an opportunity to set a constructive example.

## Ableism

### OV

Berube 2003 (Michael, “Citizenship and Disability: Disability is a matter of civil rights, even if the Supreme Court doesn't seem to agree.”, http://www.alternet.org/story/15809/citizenship\_and\_disability)

**Imagine a building in which political philosophers are debating**, in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the value and the purpose of participatory parity over against forms of authoritarianism or theocracy. Nowimagine that this building has **no access ramps**, **no Braille or large-print publications**, **no A**merican **S**ign **L**anguage **interpreters**, no elevators, no special-needs paraprofessionals, no in-class aides. Contradictory as such a state of affairs may sound, **it's a reasonably accurate picture of what contemporary debate over the meaning of democracy actually looks like**. **How can we remedy this?** Only when we have fostered equal participation in debates over the ends and means of democracy can we have a truly participatory debate over what "participatory parity" itself means. That debate will be interminable in principle, since our understandings of democracy and parity are infinitely revisable, but lest we think of deliberative democracy as a forensic society dedicated to empyreal reaches of abstraction, **we should remember** that **debates over the meaning of participatory parity set the terms for more specific debates about the varieties of human embodiment**. These include debates about prenatal screening, genetic discrimination, stem-cell research, euthanasia, and, with regard to physical access, ramps, curb cuts, kneeling buses, and buildings employing what is now known as universal design. Leftists and liberals, particularly those associated with university humanities departments, are commonly charged with being moral relativists, unable or unwilling to say (even after September 11) why one society might be "better" than another. So let me be especially clear on this final point. **I think there's a very good reason to extend the franchise, to widen the conversation, to democratize our debates, and to make disability central to our theories of egalitarian social justice**. The reason is this: a capacious and supple sense of what it is to be human is better than a narrow and partial sense of what it is to be human, and the more participants we as a society can incorporate into the deliberation of what it means to be human, the greater the chances that that deliberation will in fact be transformative in such a way as to enhance our collective capacities to recognize each other as humans entitled to human dignity. As Jamie reminds me daily, both deliberately and unwittingly, most Americans had no idea what people with Down syndrome could achieve until we'd passed and implemented and interpreted and reinterpreted a law entitling them all to a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment. I can say all this without appealing to any innate justification for human dignity and human rights, and I can also say this: Without a sufficient theoretical and practical account of disability, we can have no account of democracy worthy of the name. Perhaps some of our fellow citizens with developmental disabilities would not put the argument quite this way; **even though Jamie has led me to think this way, he doesn't talk the way I do**. But those of us who do participate in political debates, whether about school funding in a specific district or about the theory and practice of democracy at its most abstract, have the obligation to enhance the abilities of our children and our fellow citizens with disabilities to participate in the life of the United States as political and moral equals with their nondisabled peers-both for their own good, and for the good of democracy, which is to say, for the good of all of us.

### Link

#### Mobility discourse reinforces the hegemony of the mobile body

Imrie University of London Geography Professor 2000

(Rob Imrie, January 6, 2000 Environment and Planning A 2000, volume 32, Disability and discourses of mobility and movement <http://www.envplan.com/abstract.cgi?id=a331> pg. 1643 accessed 7-6-12 BC)

Such discourses see disability as a social burden which is a private, not public, responsibility. The impairment is the focus of concern, and biological intervention and care are seen as the appropriate responses. The problem of immobility is seen as personal and specific to the impairment; that it is this that needs to be eradicated, rather than transformations in sociocultural attitudes and practices, if mobility is to be restored. In particular, political and policy assumptions about mobility and movement are premised on a universal, disembodied subject which is conceived of as neutered, that is without sex, gender, or any other attributed social or hegemony of what one might term the mobile body is decontextualised from the messy world of multiple and everchanging embodiments; where there is little or no recognition of bodily biological characteristic (see Hall, 1996; Imrie, 1994; Law, 1999; Whitelegg, 1997). The differences or capabilities. The mobile body, then, is conceived of in terms of independence of movement and bodily functions; a body without physical and mental impairments.

#### Mobility is considered the core legal American framework that allows for advancement

Imrie University of London Geography Professor 2000

(Rob Imrie, January 6, 2000 Environment and Planning A 2000, volume 32, Disability and discourses of mobility and movement <http://www.envplan.com/abstract.cgi?id=a331> pg. 1642 accessed 7-6-12 BC)

Most of us expect to be able to move around the built environment with ease of access and entry into buildings. For Blomley (1994, page 413), ``rights and entitlement attached to mobility have long had a hallowed place within the liberal pantheon and, as such, mobility is part of the democratic revolution''. For instance, in the United States and Canada, mobility rights are formally enshrined in legislation and mobility is considered as fundamental to the liberty of the human body. As Hobbes (1996, page 57) has argued, ``liberty or freedom, signifieth, properly, the absence of opposition; by opposition, I mean external impediments of motion''. This, then, suggests that movement and mobility are intrinsically `good things'; practices which ought to be propagated as ends in themselves. Others see mobility as a means to an end and a mechanism for opening up opportunities. For instance, Maat and Louw (1999, page 160) assume that ``mobility gives people the opportunity to develop themselves socially and economically'' and Marshall (1999, page 4), who says that ``to be going places is to be getting on'', clearly considers mobility to be a valued commodity.

#### Right to travel is problematic unless and until it begins with discussions of access and disability

Frye 2011 (Ann, “Mobility: Rights Obligations and Equity in and Ageing Society”, http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/jtrc/DiscussionPapers/DP201105.pdf)

The concept of giving “rights” to consumers is now common in many parts of the world. But the “right” to accessible public transport or a barrier free pedestrian environment cannot be achieved without imposing obligations on those responsible for transport delivery and highway management. These include technical understanding of accessibility requirements, engagement with end users at a detailed level and investment in upgrading or replacing vehicles and infrastructure and in staff training. National and regional laws and guidelines on discrimination and rights and technical guidance are available. But there are differing views on the benefits of global standardisation and the importance of regional and local differences based on expressed needs and preferences of local people. **There is currently a significant gap in many parts of the world between the overarching legal and policy frameworks and the progress on the ground**. Changing political priorities, budget constraints and a simple lack of understanding of the scale and implications of the problem are all contributory factors. An absence of evaluation of the real life benefits of initiatives adds both to costs and frustrations. This is linked in part to a continuing perception that accessibility is about welfare and is therefore outside normal economic scrutiny. Policies such as the widespread availability of free travel to older and disabled people regardless of their means need to be re-examined. **The concept of universal design which provides more cost-effective solutions** for the population as a whole together with the economic driver of tourism among older and disabled people are helping to promote greater recognition of the need for accessibility to be an integral part of transport planning and delivery rather than a costly afterthought. However, the question of how far the transport sector can and should be held responsible for delivering and funding the necessary changes must also be explored.